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DROWNING IN WETLANDS JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION
PROCESS: IMPLEMENTATION OF RAPANOS v. UNITED STATES
Kenneth S. Gould
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Although their critical value was not recognized until midway through
the Twentieth Century,' wetlands serve many important hydrologic, ecolo-
gic, and biogeochemical functions.2 From the beginning of European settle-
ment to the present, approximately fifty percent of wetlands in the conter-
minous United States have been lost.3 In Arkansas, wetland loss over the
same period is approximately seventy-two percent,4 with an eighty-nine
percent reduction in the delta region of Arkansas. 5 Arkansas's loss of wet-
lands is greater than any other inland state.6 With the loss of wetlands comes
a concomitant loss of the many benefits provided by wetlands.
A brief glimpse into the historical, societal, and legal attitudes toward
the value of wetlands is all that is necessary to understand why so many
wetland acres have been lost. In 1900, the United States Supreme Court
noted:
We think that the trial court might well take judicial notice that the pub-
lic health is deeply concerned in the reclamation of swamp and over-
flowed lands. If there is any fact which may be supposed to be known by
everybody, and therefore by courts, it is that swamps and stagnant waters
are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police power
is never more legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances.7
* Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock. I want to express my most sincere appreciation to the Public Policy Center of the
University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture Cooperative Extension Service for their sup-
port of the writing of this paper.
1. KiM DIANA CONNOLLY, STEPHEN M. JOHSON, DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS, WETLANDS
LAW AND Poucy 2-7 (2005).
2. See infra note 18 and accompanying text for a chart summarizing the primary func-
tions, effects, and values of wetlands.
3. See CONNOLLY, supra note 1, at 2; infra note 8 (citing applicable studies).
4. THOMAS E. DAHL, WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1780's TO 1980's 6
(1990), available at
http://wetlandsfws.er.usgs.gov/status trends/national_reports/1990Status_1780s_1980s.pdf.
5. MULTI-AGENCY WETLAND PLANNING TEAM, ARKANSAS WETLAND STRATEGY 19
(1997) available at http://homepage.mac.comrarkansas-mawpt/.Public/Strategy.pdf"
6. DAHL, supra note 4.
7. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
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This early nuisance characterization began to fade as recognition of the
importance of wetlands grew steadily during the first half of the twentieth
century. In what is a notable example of the power of form over substance,
the tide toward wetlands protection turned most dramatically as a result of a
1956 Fish and Wildlife Service publication that replaced the "swamp" and
"bog" terminology with the more pleasing and appealing "wetlands."
8
Today, through court interpretation and administrative agency adoption
of related regulations, § 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1972 (the "Act") has
become the major tool for protection of wetlands.9 Section 404(a) requires a
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") for
"the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at speci-
fied disposal sites."' ° Stated generally and reduced to more common par-
lance by judicial and regulatory construction, the language of § 404(a) pro-
hibits non-permitted dredging and filling of protected waters, including wet-
lands. If the Corps concludes that development activity might harm wetlands
subject to Corps jurisdictional protection, it can decline to issue a permit to
allow development or issue a pennit under conditions designed to protect
the wetlands from harm."
On June 19, 2006, the United States Supreme Court decided the long
awaited and much anticipated case of Rapanos v. United States.12 Although
the case had been expected to clarify federal wetland protection authority
under § 404(a), specifically the authority to regulate and protect wetlands
adjacent to non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters, the
decision generated more questions than it answered. The sixty-three page
decision 3 includes five separate opinions, none commanding the agreement
of a majority of the Court.'4 Without majority support for any of the five
Rapanos opinions, the decision did not serve as the hoped-for definitive
vehicle for clarification of § 404(a) wetland protection authority. Following
Rapanos and prior related decisions, one estimate, perhaps somewhat pes-
8. Samuel P. Shaw & C. Gordon Fredine, Wetlands of the United States: Their Extent
and Their Value to Waterfowl and Other Wildlife, Fish and Wildlife Service Circular 39
(Dep't of Interior 1956) available at
http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/wetlands/uswetlan/index.htm.
9. CONNOLLY, supra note 1, at 1.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). This section was § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act as
originally enacted and is popularly known by that designation. The reference to that section
in these materials will be to § 404(a).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2000).
12. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
13. As paginated in the Supreme Court Reporter.
14. A plurality opinion of Justice Scalia in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito joined; a concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts; an opinion of Justice
Kennedy concurring in the judgment; a dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in which Jus-
tices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined; and a dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer.
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simistically, categorized one-half of United States wetlands as vulnerable to
development.' 5 After briefly reviewing the hydro-geophysical features en-
compassed by wetlands, their importance, and the history of the Corps' au-
thority to protect wetlands, this article examines Rapanos and its precursor
decisions, briefly considers the application of Justice Kennedy's controlling
concurring opinion "significant nexus" test to Arkansas wetlands, and then
focuses on the impact of the decision on the process by which wetlands are
determined to be within the jurisdictional requirements of § 404(a) of the
Clean Water Act.
II. WETLANDS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE-GENERALLY AND IN ARKANSAS
A. Wetlands Described
Although in large measure the dispute in Rapanos is about defining the
extent of wetlands for purposes of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, the starting
point for analysis of the decision and its impact is with the general connota-
tion of the term. A succinct definition of wetlands is provided by the Corps
of Engineers' regulation: "The term wetlands means those areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and dura-
tion sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil condi-
tions."' 6 The Corps' definition concludes with a working thumbnail recogni-
15. Press Release, Eric Schaeffer, The Environmental Integrity Project, Half of U.S.
Wetlands Now Vulnerable Under Unwise Decision (June 22, 2006) (on file with author and
available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pub372.cfm).
16. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b). The United States Environmental Protection Agency provides
a more elaborate and comprehensive description of wetlands:
Wetlands are areas where water covers the soil, or is present either at or near the
surface of the soil all year or for varying periods of time during the year, includ-
ing during the growing season. Water saturation (hydrology) largely determines
how the soil develops and the types of plant and animal communities living in
and on the soil. Wetlands may support both aquatic and terrestrial species. The
prolonged presence of water creates conditions that favor the growth of specially
adapted plants (hydrophytes) and promote the development of characteristic wet-
land (hydric) soils.
Wetlands vary widely because of regional and local differences in soils, topogra-
phy, climate, hydrology, water chemistry, vegetation, and other factors, including
human disturbance. Indeed, wetlands are found from the tundra to the tropics and
on every continent except Antarctica. Two general categories of wetlands are
recognized: coastal or tidal wetlands and inland or non-tidal wetlands.
Coastal wetlands in the United States, as their name suggests, are found along the
Atlantic, Pacific, Alaskan, and Gulf coasts. They are closely linked to our na-
tion's estuaries, where sea water mixes with fresh water to form an environment
of varying salinities. The salt water and the fluctuating water levels (due to tidal
action) combine to create a rather difficult environment for most plants. Conse-
2008]
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tion that, "[w]etlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar
areas.' 7
B. The Importance of Wetlands
Review of the important roles played by wetlands is helpful to an un-
derstanding of the Rapanos decision. The following chart summarizes the
primary functions, effects, and values of wetlands: 8
quently, many shallow coastal areas are unvegetated mud flats or sand flats.
Some plants, however, have successfully adapted to this environment. Certain
grasses and grasslike plants that adapt to the saline conditions form the tidal salt
marshes that are found along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts. Mangrove
swamps, with salt-loving shrubs or trees, are common in tropical climates, such
as in southern Florida and Puerto Rico. Some tidal freshwater wetlands form be-
yond the upper edges of tidal salt marshes where the influence of salt water ends.
Inland wetlands are most common on floodplains along rivers and streams (ripar-
ian wetlands), in isolated depressions surrounded by dry land (for example, pla-
yas, basins, and "potholes"), along the margins of lakes and ponds, and in other
low-lying areas where the groundwater intercepts the soil surface or where pre-
cipitation sufficiently saturates the soil (vernal pools and bogs). Inland wetlands
include marshes and wet meadows dominated by herbaceous plants, swamps
dominated by shrubs, and wooded swamps dominated by trees. Certain types of
inland wetlands are common to particular regions of the country: bogs and fens
of the northeastern and north-central states and Alaska, wet meadows or wet
prairies in the Midwest[,j inland saline and alkaline marshes and riparian wet-
lands of the arid and semiarid west prairie potholes of Iowa, Minnesota and the
Dakotas[,] alpine meadows of the west, playa lakes of the southwest and Great
Plains[,] bottomland hardwood swamps of the south pocosins[,j and Carolina
Bays of the southeast coastal states, and tundra wetlands of Alaska.
Many of these wetlands are seasonal (they are dry one or more seasons every
year), and, particularly in the arid and semiarid West, may be wet only periodi-
cally. The quantity of water present and the timing of its presence in part deter-
mine the functions of a wetland and its role in the environment. Even wetlands
that appear dry at times for significant parts of the year-such as vernal pools-
often provide critical habitat for wildlife adapted to breeding exclusively in these
areas.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AMERICA'S wETLANDs: OuR VrTAL
LINK BETwEEN LAND AND WATER 4-4 (1995), available at
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/wetlands/vital/what.html (emphasis omitted).
17. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
18. Chart adapted from United States Army Corps of Engineers, Wetland Functions and
Values as adapted from the National Science Foundation, 1995, and William J. Mitch, 1993,
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Wetlands play vital roles in recreation, tourism, protection of fish and
wildlife, and the economy.19 Property on which wetlands are located is often
desirable for development but must be filled before development can occur.
Of course, it is the filling of the wetlands that gives rise to the need for
404(a) protection.
C. Arkansas Wetlands
Wetlands in Arkansas are of five types: (1) "Riverine wetlands are []
directly flooded by streamflow, including backwater or overbank flow, at
least once in five years on average (i.e., they are within the five-year flood-
plain)"; 20 (2) "Fringe wetlands... [are found] along the margins of lakes"; 2'
(3) "Depressional wetlands" occur in topographic low points where water in
the form of precipitation, runoff, groundwater, or stream flooding accumu-
lates and remains for extended periods; 22 (4) "Flats wetlands" are also a con-
sequence of precipitation, occur in areas with little or no gradient and have
minimal overland flow into or out of the wetland except as saturated flow;
23
(5) "Slope wetlands" are the result of seepage from groundwater discharge
or shallow subsurface flow that creates saturated conditions in areas of slop-
ing land surfaces.24 Classification of wetlands is significant to the construc-
tion of Corps regulatory authority under Rapanos because there appears to
be a direct, though not precise, relationship between § 404 jurisdictional
authority and the classification category into which particular wetlands fall.
19. THE RAMsAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS, BACKGROUND PAPERS ON WETLAND
VALUES AND FUNCTIONS (2002) http://www.ramsar.org/info/valuesintroe.htm.
20. ARKANSAS MULTI-AGENCY WETLAND PLANNING TEAM, WETLANDS IN ARKANSAS,
CLASSIFICATION & CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WETLANDS OF ARKANSAS RIVERINE (2001),
http://www.mawpt.org/wetlands/classification/classes.asp?className=Riverine.
21. ARKANSAS MULTI-AGENCY WETLAND PLANNING TEAM, WETLANDS IN ARKANSAS,
CLASSIFICATION & CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WETLANDS OF ARKANSAS, FRINGE (2001),
http://www.mawpt.org/wetlands/classification/classes.asp?className-Fringe.
22. ARKANSAS MULTI-AGENCY WETLAND PLANNING TEAM, WETLANDS IN ARKANSAS,
CLASSIFICATION & CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WETLANDS OF ARKANSAS, DEPRESSIONS
(2001), http://www.mawpt.org/wetlands/classification/classes.asp?className=Depressions.
23. ARKANSAS MULTI-AGENCY WETLAND PLANNING TEAM, WETLANDS IN ARKANSAS,
CLASSIFICATION & CHARACTERIZATION OF THE WETLANDS OF ARKANSAS, FLATS (2001),
http://www.mawpt.org/wetlands/classification/classes.asp?className=Flats.
24. ARKANSAS MULTI-AGENCY WETLAND PLANNING TEAM, WETLANDS IN ARKANSAS,




III. CORPS OF ENGINEERS STATUTORY AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY
OVER WETLANDS UNDER § 404(A) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The key to gauging the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction is in the
meaning of "navigable waters" as used not only in the § 404(a)25 "discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters" terminology but also in
a number of other pollution control provisions of the Act, including the §
402 permit program for point source discharges, 26 the regulation of dis-
charges of oil and hazardous substances,27 and the regulation of discharges
of vessel sewage.28 "Navigable waters" had been well defined in various
federal regulatory contexts for over a century before its 1972 inclusion in §
404(a). The 1870 United States Supreme Court decision of The Daniel Ball 29
defined navigable waters as those that are "navigable in fact," that is, waters
that "are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be con-
ducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. ,30
Since few wetlands are navigable in fact as highways for commerce,
regulatory authority limited to the traditional navigable waters definition
would offer relatively meager wetland protection. However, the Clean Wa-
ter Act specifically defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United
States.",3' The amorphous "waters of the United States" is ostensibly a
broader concept than the traditionally and more concretely defined "naviga-
ble waters" and yields a definitional puzzle rather than clarity. The Act of-
fers no further guidance as to the scope of the "navigable waters" and "wa-
ters of the United States" terminology. It is the conundrum presented by the
definition of "navigable waters" that gives rise to the controversy surround-
ing the extent of the Corps' regulatory authority to protect wetlands. The
essential questions are whether "waters of the United States" is simply a
synonym for navigable waters as traditionally defined or whether the term
encompasses a broader construct, and, if broader, what is the extent of the
Corps' § 404(a) jurisdictional authority.
25. Section 404(a) requires a permit for "the discharge of dredged or fill material into
the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 prohibits "discharge of any pollutant" in general. The definitional
section of the Clean Water Act, § 1362, defines the terms "discharge of a pollutant" and
"discharge of pollutants" as meaning "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source .... 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1322 (2000).
29. 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
30. Id. at 563.
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000). "The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas." Id.
2008]
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The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency
have adopted regulations reading § 404(a) jurisdiction expansively, 32 inter-
preting the "waters of the United States" definition of "navigable waters" as
granting authority to regulate beyond traditional navigable waters:
The terms "navigable waters of the United States" and "waters of the
United States" are used frequently throughout these regulations, and it is
important from the outset that the reader understand the difference be-
tween the two. "Navigable waters of the United States" are defined in 33
CFR part 329. These are waters that are navigable in the traditional sense
where permits are required for certain work or structures pursuant to
Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. "Waters of the
United States" are defined in 33 CFR part 328. These waters include
more than navigable waters of the United States and are the waters
where permits are required for the discharge of dredged or fill material
pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
33
More specifically, the Corps' regulations define "the waters of the
United States" to include:
3 4
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all wa-
ters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide [traditional inter-
state navigable waters];
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including in-
termittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie pot-
holes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce in-
cluding any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for rec-
reational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in inter-
state or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries
in interstate commerce;
32. The Corps' regulations initially construed the statutory language to cover navigable
in fact waters only. See 39 Fed. Reg. 12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §
209.120(d)(1)). In 1975 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined
the regulations as too narrowly drawn, and the Corps did not appeal the decision. See Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.C. 1975). The Corps
then adopted new regulations that sought to extend the reach of the "waters of the United
States" definition to the bounds of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See 40
Fed. Reg. 31,324-25 (July 25, 1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144, n.2 (July 25, 1977).
33. 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(d) (emphasis added).
34. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
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(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the Unit-
ed States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in (a)(1) through (4), of this section;
(6) The territorial seas; and
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1)through (6) of this section ....
To flesh out the meaning of adjacency, the Corps' regulations define "adja-
cent" as "bordering, contiguous, or neighboring" and include wetlands "se-
parated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barri-
ers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like ....
The ultimate limitation on § 404(a) jurisdiction is Congress's authority
under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 37 Though the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the extent of Congress's jurisdiction granting authority under
that Commerce Clause has waxed and waned over the years, until recently
the trend was for the Court to read the Commerce Clause expansively.38 In
several cases beginning in 1995, however, the Court has retreated somewhat
from the high water mark of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In the 1995
case, United States v. Lopez,39 the Court held that the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 forbidding "any individual knowingly to possess
a firearm at a place that [he] knows .. . is a school zone" exceeded Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority. To come within that authority, the ac-
tivity must fall within at least one of three categories:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce .... Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
state commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities .... Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce ....
35. Id.
36. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c).
37. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
38. "After broadly construing the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause for nearly sixty years, in 1995, the Supreme Court stunned many legal commentators
by striking down a federal statute regulating intrastate gun possession near local schools in
United States v. Lopez, a five-to-four decision .... Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate
Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Au-
thority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 723
(2002).
39. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
40. Id. at 55-59.
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In 2000, United States v. Morrison41 struck down the federal Violence
Against Women Act. The Court found that even though Congress had as-
sembled data demonstrating that intrastate violence against women did have
an impact on interstate commerce, "[tihe regulation and punishment of in-
trastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or
goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States.,42 In addition, the Court stated, "[w]e ... reject the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely
on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. '43 The Court's
focus was on the regulated activity having some economic character, con-
cluding that "Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates
that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce,
the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor." Al-
though precise translation of the recent Commerce Clause cases to the con-
text of the extent of § 404 jurisdictional authority is difficult, the contraction
of Commerce Clause reach is reflected in both the plurality's and Justice
Kennedy's opinions in Rapanos and in the majority's opinion in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers,45 the Supreme Court § 404(a) jurisdictional decision preceding Ra-
panos.46
41. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
42. Id. at 618.
43. Id. at 617.
44. Id. at611.
45. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ("SWANCC").
46. From Justice Scalia's opinion for the plurality in Rapanos:
Likewise, just as we noted in SWANCC, the Corps' interpretation stretches the
outer limits of Congress's commerce power and raises difficult questions about
the ultimate scope of that power. See 531 U.S. at 173. (In developing the current
regulations, the Corps consciously sought to extend its authority to the farthest
reaches of the commerce power. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37127 (1977)). Even if the
term "the waters of the United States" were ambiguous as applied to channels
that sometimes host ephemeral flows of water (which it is not), we would expect
a clearer statement from Congress to authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction
that presses the envelope of constitutional validity.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 715 (2006).
Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion in Rapanos that "in SWANCC, by inter-
preting the Act to require a significant nexus with navigable waters, the Court avoided appli-
cations-those involving waters without a significant nexus-that appeared likely, as a cate-
gory, to raise constitutional difficulties and federalism concerns .... Id. at 776. Justice Ken-
nedy continued stating as follows:
This interpretation of the Act does not raise federalism or Commerce Clause
concerns sufficient to support a presumption against its adoption. To be sure, the
significant nexus requirement may not align perfectly with the traditional extent
of federal authority. Yet in most cases regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to
[Vol. 30
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IV. THE PATH TO RAPANOS
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
If the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act had simply been by
reference to the traditional definition of "navigable waters," as adopted in
The Daniel Ball and recited in numerous other Supreme Court decisions
47
the proposition that § 404(a) requires a Corps permit to fill wetlands could
not be sustained in most cases. The Act's definition of "navigable waters" as
"the waters of the United States," however, raises the questions of whether
the waters covered by the Clean Water Act are more extensive than those to
which the traditional definition applies and whether the regulations adopting
a broder interpretation are valid. That the primary concern of the Clean
Water Act is with water pollution rather than navigation48 gives some cre-
tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no se-
rious constitutional or federalism difficulty....
Id. at 782. Justice Kennedy stated further that "[t]he possibility of legitimate Commerce
Clause and federalism concerns in some circumstances does not require the adoption of an
interpretation that departs in all cases from the Act's text and structure." Id. at 783.
From the majority opinion in SWANCC:
These are significant constitutional questions raised by respondents' application
of their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear statement from
Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit
such as we have here. Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over
ponds and mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird Rule" would result in a
significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land
and water use... We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant con-
stitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative deference.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
47. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 406 (1940); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 15 (1935);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49,
56 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); Oklahoma
v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 323 (1917); Leovy
v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 630-31 (1900); United States v. Rio Grande, Dam & Irriga-
tion Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891); The Montello,
87 U.S. 430, 439 (1874).
48. As expressed in the Clean Water Act, the goal and policy of Congress is as follows:
[T]o restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, con-
sistent with the provisions of this chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable wa-
ters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water qual-
ity which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wild-
life and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
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dence to a broader construction of the "waters of the United States" phrase,
a notion recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1985 decision of United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,49 the first step on the Supreme
Court's road to Rapanos.
In Riverside Bayview Homes the Court considered whether the Corps'
jurisdiction under § 404(a) extended to a wetland adjacent to a traditional
navigable stream flowing into Lake St. Clair in Michigan. 50 The wetland
was saturated by groundwater, not surface water, but "the area characterized
by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the
boundary of [Riverside Bayview's] property to Black Creek, a navigable
waterway.'
The Court in Riverside Bayview Homes noted that "[o]n a purely lin-
guistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify 'lands,' wet or other-
wise, as 'waters. ' ' 52 The Court, however, recognized that:
Such a simplistic response, however, does justice neither to the problem
faced by the Corps in defining the scope of its authority under § 404(a)
nor to the realities of the problem of water pollution that the Clean Water
Act was intended to combat. In determining the limits of its power to re-
gulate discharges under the Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some
point at which water ends and land begins. Our common experience tells
us that this is often no easy task: the transition from water to solid
ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, be-
tween open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats,
swamps, bogs-in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly aqua-
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts
be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be provided to con-
struct publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment management planning
processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate control of sources of
pollutants in each State;
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration effort be
made to develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants in-
to the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans; and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of
pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to en-
able the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both point and non-
point sources of pollution.
33 U.S.C. 1251 (2000).
49. 474 U.S. 121, 121 (1985).
50. Id. at 131.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 132.
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tic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on this con-
tinuum to find the limit of "waters" is far from obvious.
53
The Court found that inundation or frequent flooding by the adjacent water-
way was not necessary to the Corps' regulatory authority," and that the wet-
land fit within the regulation, giving the regulation "Chevron deference. 55
As stated in Riverside Bayview Homes, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. 56 an agency's construction and applica-
tion "of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. 57
Of perhaps greatest interest to the significance to be accorded the "na-
vigable waters" terminology in the Clean Water Act, the Court in Riverside
Bayview Homes discounted the weight to be attributed to the term, saying:
[T]he Act's definition of "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United
States" makes it clear that the term "navigable" as used in the Act is of
limited import. In adopting this definition of "navigable waters," Con-
gress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on fed-
eral regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise
its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters
that would not be deemed "navigable" under the classical understanding
of that term.
58
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers
The question of the significance to be given "navigable waters" in §
404(a) also arose sixteen years later in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers. 9 In SWANCC the
Court considered the Corps' authority to regulate wetlands with no hydro-
logic connection to traditional navigable waters, an issue specifically left
open in Riverside Bayview Homes.6° The waters in SWANCC were seasonal
pond depressions at an abandoned gravel quarry that SWANCC wanted to
use as a waste disposal site. The Corps' claim to jurisdiction over the iso-
lated ponds was not based on a hydrologic connection to traditional naviga-
ble waters but on its "Migratory Bird Rule." That "rule" was incorporated
into the 1986 Final Rule for Regulations for the Regulatory Program of the
53. Id.
54. Id. at 130.
55. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 130-31.
56. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
57. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131.
58. Id. at 133.
59. 531 U.S. 159 (2001); see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
60. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131, n.8.
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Corps of Engineers issued, in part, to clarify § 328.3(a)(3) of the Corps'
regulation defining "waters of the United States" as including the following:
"All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermit-
tent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction
of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such
waters . "...,,61 The clarification of the regulation was that "waters of the
United States" includes waters "[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by
birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties;" or "[w]hich are or would be
used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines ....- The
rule premised the Corps' jurisdiction on the waters being susceptible for use
by migratory birds and that the birds were protected by treaty. In a five-to-
four decision the Court held that the Corps' Migratory Bird regulation ex-
ceeded the authority granted the Corps under § 404 of the Act, a ruling dic-
tated in part by the Court's desire to avoid deciding whether the rule ex-
ceeded the limits of Commerce Clause authority and whether the rule in-
voked federalism concerns by invading traditional state interests in the de-
velopment and use of land and water resources.6 3
The narrow holding of SWANCC has little direct bearing on Rapanos.
In SWANCC, however, the Court revived the significance of the term "navi-
gable waters" for Clean Water Act jurisdiction, emphasizing that "[i]t was
the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that in-
formed our reading of the [Clean Water Act] in Riverside Bayview Homes"
64
and that the Corps itself had originally limited its jurisdiction under the Act
to traditionally navigable waters.65 Accordingly, the Court concluded that:
61. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2008).
62. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg 41206, 41,217 (Nov.
13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
63. Addressing commerce clause and federalism concerns raised by the Migratory Bird
regulation, the Court stated:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.
This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach consti-
tutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize ad-
ministrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional au-
thority. This concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters
the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a tradi-
tional state power. Thus, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress."
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)) (internal citations omitted).
64. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
65. Id. at 168.
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We cannot agree that Congress' separate definitional use of the phrase
"waters of the United States" constitutes a basis for reading the term
"navigable waters" out of the statute. We said in Riverside Bayview
Homes that the word "navigable" in the statute was of "limited effect,"
and went on to hold that § 404(a) extended to nonnavigable wetlands ad-
jacent to open waters. But it is one thing to give a word limited effect
and quite another to give it no effect whatever. The term "navigable" has
at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its au-
thority for enacting the Clean Water Act: its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably
be so made.
66
At least in part on constitutional grounds, the SWANCC Court also de-
clined to grant Chevron deference to the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule regula-
tion, finding that there were:
[S]ignificant constitutional questions raised by respondents' application
of their regulations, and yet we find nothing approaching a clear state-
ment from Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand
and gravel pit such as we have here. Permitting respondents to claim
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the "Migra-
tory Bird Rule" would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use. Rather than ex-
pressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance in this manner,
Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary respon-
sibilities and rights of States ... to plan the development and use ... of
land and water resources .... " We thus read the statute as written to
avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by re-
spondents' interpretation, and therefore reject the request for administra-
tive deference.
67
Nevertheless, after SWANCC, the Corps interpreted the decision narrowly,
declined to amend its regulations, and continued to assert jurisdiction over
non-navigable tributaries, jurisdiction lower federal courts in general up-
held.68 The stage was thus set for the Rapanos case.
66. Id. at 172.
67. Id. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44
(1994) ("[Rlegulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local govern-
ments.") and 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(b)) (internal citations omitted).
68. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia cited the following post SWANCC cases as examples of
"sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains as 'tributaries'.:
[C]ourts have held that jurisdictional "tributaries" include the "intermittent flow
of surface water through approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and man-
made ditches (paralleling and crossing under 1-64)," [Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc.,
344 F.3d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 2003)]; a "roadside ditch" whose water took "a wind-
ing, thirty-two-mile path to the Chesapeake Bay," [United States v. Deaton, 332
F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003)]; irrigation ditches and drains that intermittently
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C. Rapanos v. United States
1. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Rapanos plurality with expres-
sion of thinly veiled outrage at the Corps' § 404 permitting process, stating:
The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small part of the
immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred
under the Clean Water Act-without any change in the governing stat-
ute-during the past five Presidential administrations. In the last three
decades, the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
have interpreted their jurisdiction over "the waters of the United States"
to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United States-
including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower
[forty-eight] States. And that was just the beginning .... In fact, the en-
tire land area of the United States lies in some drainage basin, and an
endless network of visible channels furrows the entire surface, contain-
ing water ephemerally wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land contain-
ing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a "water of the United
States."'69
In addition, Justice Scalia painted the defendant, John Rapanos, as a
sympathetic victim of the exercise of "the discretion of an enlightened des-
pot," that is, the Corps of Engineers, noting that "[i]n this litigation, for ex-
ample, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced [sixty-three]
months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil
fines."7 ° In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy presented a more com-
plete picture of Mr. Rapanos's conduct that placed his liberty and financial
fortunes in jeopardy:
In December 1988, Mr. Rapanos, hoping to construct a shopping center,
asked the Michigan Department of Natural Resources to inspect the
Salzburg site. A state official informed Rapanos that while the site likely
included regulated wetlands, Rapanos could proceed with the project if
the wetlands were delineated (that is, identified and preserved) or if a
connect to covered waters, [Community Assn. for Restoration of Environment v.
Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954-955 (9th Cir. 2002)1; [Headwaters, Inc.
v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001)]; and (most implau-
sibly of all) the "washes and arroyos" of an "arid development site," located in
the middle of the desert, through which "water courses ... during periods of
heavy rain," [Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
2005)].
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726-27 (2006).
69. Id. at 722.
70. Id. at 721.
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permit were obtained. Pursuing the delineation option, Rapanos hired a
wetlands consultant to survey the property. The results evidently dis-
pleased Rapanos: Informed that the site included between [forty-eight]
and [fifty-eight] acres of wetlands, Rapanos allegedly threatened to "de-
stroy" the consultant unless he eradicated all traces of his report. Ra-
panos then ordered $350,000 worth of earthmoving and land clearing
work that filled in [twenty-two] of the [sixty-four] wetlands acres on the
Salzburg site. He did so without a permit and despite receiving cease-
and-desist orders from state officials and the EPA. At the Hines Road
and Pine River sites, construction work-again conducted in violation of
state and federal compliance orders-altered an additional [seventeen] and
[fifteen] wetlands acres, respectively.7'
Raponos involved four different wetland sites, three owned or con-
trolled by Rapanos and one by the Carabells.72 At all four sites the Corps
attempted regulation under § 404(a) by seeking to require that the defen-
dants apply for permits to fill the wetlands. All four sites were adjacent to
non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters. In the Carabell
case the wetland was also separated from the tributary, a human-made drai-
nage ditch, by a four foot wide human-made impermeable berm, though
apparently water from the wetland occasionally overflowed the berm into
the ditch.73
For the plurality, Justice Scalia began his substantive consideration of
the case by rejecting the argument that the "waters of the United States"
definition of "navigable waters" should be limited to the traditional "navi-
gable in fact" standard. He turned to the language of the Act itself to estab-
lish that the definition of "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States" indicated that the Act's jurisdictional scope included something
more than traditional navigable waters, also noting that, "[w]e need not de-
cide the precise extent to which the qualifiers 'navigable' and 'of the United
States' restrict the coverage of the Act. Whatever the scope of these qualifi-
ers, the Clean Water Act authorizes federal jurisdiction only over 'wa-
ters."' 74 For the definition of the key term "waters," Justice Scalia turned to
71. Id. at 763.
72. Rapanos combined two cases for review: Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629
(6th Cir. 2004) and Carabell v. United States, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004). A website with
links to numerous documents and other materials, including photographs, related to the Ca-
rabell and Rapanos cases has been created for academic purposes by Professor Kim Diana
Connolly of the University of South Carolina School of Law. The website was created for use
by Professor Connolly's students and others interested in studying the cases. See
http://law.sc.edu/wetlands/rapanos-carabellU.
73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730.
74. Id. at 731. Justice Scalia explained further as follows:
The Rapanos petitioners contend that the terms "navigable waters" and "waters
of the United States" in the Act must be limited to the traditional definition of
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the 1954 edition of Webster's New International Dictionary.7 From that
dictionary definition he extracted the standard adopted by the plurality, find-
ing that:
[O]n its only plausible interpretation, the phrase "the waters of the Unit-
ed States" includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continu-
ously flowing bodies of water "forming geographic features" that are de-
scribed in ordinary parlance as "streams[,] . . .oceans, rivers, [and]
lakes." The phrase does not include channels through which water flows
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drai-
nage for rainfall. The Corps' expansive interpretation of "the waters of
the United States" is thus not "based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 76
In addition, Justice Scalia would require that the wetlands be "adja-
cent," within his conception of adjacency, to waters that meet the test of
"waters of the United States":
The Daniel Ball, which required that the "waters" be navigable in fact, or suscep-
tible of being rendered so. See 10 Wall., at 563, 19 L.Ed. 999. But this definition
cannot be applied wholesale to the CWA. The Act uses the phrase "navigable
waters" as a defined term, and the definition is simply "the waters of the United
States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Moreover, the Act provides, in certain circum-
stances, for the substitution of state for federal jurisdiction over "navigable wa-
ters ... other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to
use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to trans-
port interstate or foreign commerce ... including wetlands adjacent thereto." §
1344(g)(1) (emphasis added). This provision shows that the Act's term "naviga-
ble waters" includes something more than traditional navigable waters. We have
twice stated that the meaning of "navigable waters" in the Act is broader than the
traditional understanding of that term, SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 121 S. Ct.
675; Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133, 106 S.Ct. 455.
Id. at 730-31.
75. Picking up on the dictionary definition of "waters," Justice Scalia stated:
"[Tlhe waters" refers more narrowly to water "[als found in streams and bodies
forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes," or "the flow-
ing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies."
Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Web-
ster's Second). On this definition, "the waters of the United States" include only
relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water. The definition refers
to water as found in "streams," "oceans," "rivers," "lakes," and "bodies" of water
"forming geographical features." Ibid. All of these terms connote continuously
present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through
which water occasionally or intermittently flows. Even the least substantial of the
definition's terms, namely "streams," connotes a continuous flow of water in a
permanent channel-especially when used in company with other terms such as
"rivers,". "lakes," and "oceans." None of these terms encompasses transitory
puddles or ephemeral flows of water.
Id. at 732-33.
76. Id. at 739 (citing WEBSTER'S SECOND 2882).
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Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
bodies that are "waters of the United States" in their own right, so that
there is no clear demarcation between "waters "and wetlands, are "adja-
cent to" such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an in-
termittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to "waters of the
United States" do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of River-
side Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to covered waters
that we described as a "significant nexus" in SWANCC.... Thus, estab-
lishing that wetlands such as those at the Rapanos and Carabell sites are
covered by the Act requires two findings: First, that the adjacent channel
contains a "wate[r] of the United States," (i.e., a relatively permanent
body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and
second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that
water, making it difficult to determine where the "water" ends and the
"wetland" begins."
Since the Corps of Engineers regulation defines "waters of the United
States" more broadly than Justice Scalia's view of the statute would allow,
he would find the regulation invalid.78 In addition, the plurality determined
that only its definition of "waters of the United States" was consistent with
principles of federalism and the Act's policy of respecting states' rights.
79
To the plurality, the Corps' regulation would run the risk of impermissibly
involving the federal government in local land use planning.8 °
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence- "Significant Nexus"
In an ironic result of the fractured decision in Rapanos, of the three ma-
jor opinions in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by no other
Justice, is of greatest significance,8' at least until an additional decision of
77. Id. at 742 (emphasis in original).
78. Id., at 732.
79. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737.
80. Id. at 737-38. Making his point that the Corps' regulation encroached on local land
use planning authority, Justice Scalia stated:
As we noted in SWANCC, the Government's expansive interpretation would "re-
sult in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power
over land and water use.". . . Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of
the development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a quin-
tessential state and local power .... The extensive federal jurisdiction urged by
the Government would authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of
immense stretches of intrastate land-an authority the agency has shown its will-
ingness to exercise with the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning
board.
Id.
81. See infra Part V for an analysis of the relative significance of the three major opin-




the Supreme Court, Congressional legislation," or agency regulation brings
clarification. In contradistinction to the Court's token and unexplained use
of the term "significant nexus" in SWANCC, 84 for Justice Kennedy those
words become the key to § 404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands." In his con-
currence Justice Kennedy imbues the significant nexus term with an elabo-
rate substantive structure, concluding as follows:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statu-
tory phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands, either alone or in combi-
nation with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as "navigable." When, in contrast, wetlands' effects
on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the
zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term "navigable waters."
86
82. See infra text accompanying notes 160, 162-63 for discussion of legislation pending
in the House and Senate that would, in effect, adopt the language of the Corps' expansive
regulatory construction of "waters of the United States" as the statutory definition of the term
(Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, S. 1870, 110th Cong. (2007)).
83. Clarification through revised regulations is unlikely under the Bush administration.
The initial post Rapanos efforts of the EPA and Corps of Engineers have focused on giving
EPA regions and Corps districts guidance for implementing Rapanos. More than a year after
the Rapanos decision, those efforts culminated in the June 5, 2007 formal Guidance issued
jointly by the agencies. Contemporaneous with the issuance of the Guidance, the agencies
responded to a series of "Key Questions for Guidance Release." One of those questions asked
whether the EPA and the Corps will proceed to develop regulations to clarify the scope of
Clean Water Act jurisdiction. In pertinent part, the response stated:
Rulemaking is among several actions the Administration is considering in re-
sponse to the Rapanos decision. Rulemaking takes time-certainly well over a
year to develop a final rule, in part, because of the important public notice and
comment provisions called for under the Administrative Procedure Act. Agency
guidance can more quickly assist regulators, the regulated community, and the
public to understand and consistently apply the CWA. As a result, EPA and the
Corps have focused efforts to date on developing the Guidance issued today....
Any decision to pursue new rulemaking will be collaborative, as will the substan-
tive work of developing any new rules to establish a revised regulatory definition
of "waters of the [United States]."
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CORPS
AND EPA RESPONSES TO THE RAPANOS DECISION KEY QUESTIONS FOR GUIDANCE RELEASE 6
(2007), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/13RapanosQ&As.pdf.
84. The only reference to "significance nexus" in SWANCC was the cryptic comment
that "[i]t was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that in-
formed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes." SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167
(2001).
85. "Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking. Because neither
the plurality nor the dissent addresses the nexus requirement, this separate opinion, in my
respectful view, is necessary." Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 780.
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As an interpretive gloss on the significant nexus test, the required connec-
tion is to be assessed under the framework of the statute's objectives of re-
storing and maintaining "the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters. 87
3. The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer
Justice Stevens and the three justices who joined his dissenting opinion
would uphold the status quo. That is, the four dissenters would validate the
Corps' regulation broadly defining "waters of the United States" and would
give the regulation Chevron deference.8" As indicated in his separate dissent,
Justice Breyer would simply hold that the authority of the Corps under the
Clean Water Act "extends to the limits of congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce.,
89
Under both the plurality decision and Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
the Rapanos and Carabell decisions were to be remanded to the lower court
for application of the quite divergent standards announced in those opinions,
agreement between the plurality and Justice Kennedy being limited primar-
ily to the decision to remand. On February 12, 2007, the cases were re-
manded to the Sixth Circuit, which in turn remanded the cases to the district
court with instructions to remand the cases to the Corps.90
V. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RAPANOS
Of course, the first issue confronting courts attempting to apply the law
of the Rapanos case is to determine just what that law is. That is, what is the
legal standard to be divined from a fractured 4-1-4 decision that lacks an
opinion to which a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court subscribe?
In the Courts of Appeals' decisions since Rapanos, two primary approaches
have emerged.
87. Id. at 759 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)).
88. Id. at 788. In contrast to Justice Scalia's view that the Chevron deference was not
allowable because, "[t]he Corps' expansive interpretation of 'the waters of the United
States"' is thus not "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 739. Justice
Stevens's dissent viewed deference as a given: "The Corps' resulting decision to treat these
wetlands as encompassed within the term 'waters of the United States' is a quintessential
example of the Executive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision." Id. at 788
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
45 (1984)). See also, Id. at 811 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
89. Id.




Several courts have attempted to follow the traditional protocol pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court in Marks v. United States91 for reading frac-
tured Supreme Court decisions that produce no single rationale for the
Court's judgment. The standard from Marks advises that: "When a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds .... ,,92
Representative of courts attempting a literal application of that stan-
dard, the Ninth Circuit in Northern California River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg,93 viewed Justice Kennedy's concurrence as the guiding opin-
ion, stating, "Justice Kennedy, constituting the fifth vote for reversal, con-
curred only in the judgment and, therefore, provides the controlling rule of
law."94
Other courts have followed the suggestion of Justice Stevens in his dis-
sent in Rapanos:
In these cases [Rapanos and Carabell], however, while both the plurality
and Justice KENNEDY agree that there must be a remand for further
proceedings, their respective opinions define different tests to be applied
on remand. Given that all four Justices who have joined this opinion
would uphold the Corps' jurisdiction in both of these cases-and in all
other cases in which either the plurality's or Justice KENNEDY's test is
satisfied-on remand each of the judgments should be reinstated if either
of those tests is met. 95
In a footnote to that statement, Justice Stevens explained that:
I assume that Justice KENNEDY's approach will be controlling in most
cases because it treats more of the Nation's waters as within the Corps'
jurisdiction, but in the unlikely event that the plurality's test is met but
Justice KENNEDY's is not, courts should also uphold the Corps' juris-
diction. In sum, in these and future cases the United States may elect to
prove jurisdiction under either test.96
For courts following Justice Stevens's suggestion, Clean Water Act jurisdic-
tion will be found if either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's standards
from Rapanos can be satisfied. This approach mirrors the practical align-
91. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
92. Id. at 193 (quoting the opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ. in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
93. 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 1029.
95. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at n.14.
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ment of opinions within the Court and, the Marks case notwithstanding,
hones in on those aspects of the decision on which a majority of the Court
are in agreement.97
In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. ,98 the Seventh Circuit ex-
pounded on the approach suggested by Justice Stevens. In Gerke Excavat-
ing, the court undertook a careful analysis of the proper approach to resolv-
ing the standard to be applied from the fractured Rapanos decision:
When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a
case and not on the ground for that outcome, lower-court judges are to
follow the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would
have assented if forced to choose. In Rapanos, that is Justice Kennedy's
ground.
The test he proposed is that "wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and
thus come within the statutory phrase 'navigable waters,' if the wetlands,
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
97. Since deciding Marks, the Supreme Court has twice noted that the Marks test "is
more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result .... Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994).
In Grutter and Nichols the Court also noted that "[ilt does not seem 'useful to pursue the
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided
the lower courts that have considered it."' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-
46.
The opinion of the trial court in the Grutter case offered a cogent explanation of why the
Marks analysis is not appropriate for plurality decisions like Rapanos in which the opinions
constituting the plurality are fundamentally different:
In Marks the Court stated that the "governing standards" of [A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966) ("Memoirs")] were those announced by the three-Justice plurality be-
cause the other Justices who concurred in the judgment did so "on broader
grounds."
The Court in Marks did not clearly explain what it meant by "narrow" and
"broad" grounds. But in that particular case, the plurality's opinion was the "nar-
rowest" in the sense that it was the most conservative reason for reversing the
finding of obscenity and it was a reason that was subsumed within the grounds
articulated by the other justices who concurred in the judgment.
The Marks framework cannot be applied to a case like [Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) ("Bakke")], where the various Jus-
tices' reasons for concurring in the judgment are not merely different by degree,
as they were in Memoirs, but are so fundamentally different as to not be compa-
rable in terms of "narrowness."
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd on other grounds,
288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
98. 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
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other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.' When, in
contrast, wetlands' effects on water quality are speculative or insubstan-
tial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term
'navigable waters."' This test is narrower (so far as reining in federal au-
thority is concerned) than the plurality's in most cases, though not in all
because Justice Kennedy also said that "by saying the Act covers wet-
lands (however remote) possessing a surface-water connection with a
continuously flowing stream (however small), the plurality's reading
would permit applications of the statute as far from traditional federal
authority as are the waters it deems beyond the statute's reach."
Thus, any conclusion that Justice Kennedy reaches in favor of federal au-
thority over wetlands in a future case will command the support of five
Justices (himself plus the four dissenters), and in most cases in which he
concludes that there is no federal authority he will command five votes
(himself plus the four Justices in the Rapanos plurality), the exception
being a case in which he would vote against federal authority only to be
outvoted 8-to-i (the four dissenting Justices plus the members of the Ra-
panos plurality) because there was a slight surface hydrological connec-
tion. The plurality's insistence that the issue of federal authority be gov-
erned by strict rules will on occasion align the Justices in the plurality
with the Rapanos dissenters when the balancing approach of Justice
Kennedy favors the landowner. But that will be a rare case, so as a prac-
tical matter the Kennedy concurrence is the least common denominator
(always, when his view favors federal authority). 99
Of the first six Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions applying Rapanos,
five found Justice Kennedy's concurrence to be the governing decision,"°
while the First Circuit determined that Clean Water Act jurisdiction may be
found under either the plurality's test or that of Justice Kennedy.'' How-
ever, all circuits would agree that the prospect of a majority of the justices
finding wetlands to be jurisdictional under circumstances in which Justice
Kennedy would not, in the language of the Seventh Circuit in Gerke Exca-
vating, "be a rare case."' 2 As a practical matter, Justice Kennedy's view
will almost always be controlling, and it is his concurring opinion on which
this article's attempt at analysis will primarily focus. That analysis will be
directed at demonstrating that although in the abstract the significant nexus
99. Id. at 724-25 (internal citations omitted).
100. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (lth Cir. 2007); Northern California River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d
984 (9th Cir. 2007); San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
101. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (lst Cir. 2006).
102. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725. In Gerke Excavating, the Seventh Circuit also




test plausibly rationalizes the divergent "navigable waters" and "waters of
the United States" language of § 404(a), the test fails for impracticability of
application.
VI. ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONTROLLING OPINION
Since in all but rare cases Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion will
provide the standard for § 404(a) jurisdiction and will effectively set the
standard to be applied from Rapanos, his opinion will be further examined
to determine the impact of the decision. The examination begins with recog-
nition that the text and definitional section of the Clean Water Act presented
the Rapanos Court with a virtually irresolvable conundrum. 0 3 As noted, §
404(a) limits wetland protection to "navigable waters," a term which stand-
ing alone and with reference to pre-Clean Water Act interpretations had a
clear and definite meaning, that is, waters that are "navigable in fact" in that
they "are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be con-
ducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.""" Since almost
by definition, wetlands are generally not susceptible for use as thoroughfares
for trade or travel, in isolation the definition of navigable waters would ex-
clude nearly all wetlands. But, as noted, under the Clean Water Act the tra-
ditional definition of "navigable waters" is not necessarily the end point of
the Act's jurisdictional reach because the Act specifically defines "navigable
waters" as "waters of the United States."'0 5 However, the Act itself offers no
further indication of the meaning of those terms or how their juxtaposition is
to be harmonized. Three general definitional options are possible: (1) con-
strue "waters of the United States" as simply adopting by reference the tra-
ditional definition given "navigable waters;"' 6 (2) disregard "navigable wa-
ters" as a possible limitation on "waters of the United States" and focus on
the meaning of the latter term;1°7 or (3) attempt to reconcile the terms in a
way that gives some effect to both. 08 In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy attempts
reconciliation on a basis that is Constitutionally and interpretively plausible
103. As noted by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Rapanos, "Congress'
choice of words creates difficulties, for the Act contemplates regulation of certain 'navigable
waters' that are not in fact navigable." Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006).
104. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 557 (1870). See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying
text.
105. See supra Part III.
106. None of the opinions in Rapanos take this approach.
107. This is the approach of Justice Stevens in both Rapanos and SWANCC.
108. This is the approach of the Rapanos plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's concur-
ring opinion in Rapanos.
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but that carries results that present significant constraints on the efficacy of
the wetlands protection program contemplated by § 404(a).
In attempting to square the Act's use of both "waters of the United
States" and the qualifying "navigable waters," Justice Kennedy first notes
that "Congress' choice of words creates difficulties, for the Act contem-
plates regulation of certain 'navigable waters' that are not in fact naviga-
ble.' '" °" But, he concludes that "the word 'navigable' in the Act must be giv-
en some effect."" His route to giving some significance to "navigable" is to
construct an elaborate and complex jurisdictional standard simplistically
summed up as the "significant nexus" test, *a phrase borrowed from
SWANCC, where it was used without elaboration to explain the result in
Riverside Bayview Homes."'
As noted, under the "significant nexus" test, the Corps' jurisdiction
over wetlands "depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between
the wetland in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense."
' 12
That is, the "navigable waters" language serves to restrict the potential reach
of "waters of the United States" to those waters that have the requisite con-
nection with waters that are traditionally considered to be navigable." 3 To
Justice Kennedy, the significant nexus requirement explained both Riverside
Bayview Homes and SWANCC:
Thus, in SWANCC the Court rejected the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction
over isolated ponds and mudflats bearing no evident connection to navi-
gable-in-fact waters. And in Riverside Bayview, while the Court indi-
cated that "the term 'navigable' as used in the Act is of limited import,"
it relied, in upholding jurisdiction, on the Corps' judgment that "wet-
lands adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may
function as integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the
moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent
bodies of water[.]" . . . The implication, of course, was that wetlands'
status as "integral parts of the aquatic environment"-that is, their sig-
nificant nexus with navigable waters-was what established the Corps'
jurisdiction over them as waters of the United States." 
4
To flesh out the "significant nexus" test, Justice Kennedy notes that the
connection between the wetlands and the traditional navigable waters "must
be assessed in terms of the statute's goals and purposes.""' That is, that:
109. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
112. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779.
113. Id.




Congress enacted the law to "restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" and it pursued that
objective by restricting dumping and filling in "navigable waters." With
respect to wetlands, the rationale for Clean Water Act regulation is, as
the Corps has recognized, that wetlands can perform critical functions re-
lated to the integrity of other waters-functions such as pollutant trapping,
flood control, and runoff storage.' 16
Justice Kennedy would presume a "significant nexus" between wet-
lands adjacent "7 to navigable-in-fact waters, finding that "the Corps' con-
clusive standard for jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable inference of ecolo-
gic interconnection, and the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is
sustainable under the Act by showing adjacency alone.""' 8 However, lacking
adjacency to navigable-in-fact waters, the requisite significant nexus be-
tween the wetlands and traditional navigable waters must be established on a
case-by-case basis." 9
Of the five types of Arkansas wetlands, "riverine"'2 ° and "fringe wet-
lands,"1 2' with their close proximity to streams and lakes, are likely to meet
Justice Scalia's conception of "adjacency" to waters that are "waters of the
United States" and thus be considered jurisdictional under the plurality's
test. In addition, for similar reasons, riverine and fringe wetlands may fall
within Justice Kennedy's "conclusive standard for jurisdiction" that rests
upon a reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection by showing adja-
cency alone and thus not require a significant nexus determination. Because
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Under the Corps' regulations defining "waters of the United States," "[t]he term
,adjacent' means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other wa-
ters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and
the like are "adjacent wetlands."' 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c).
118. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780.
119. Justice Kennedy foresaw the possibility of other circumstances in which Corps juris-
diction might be conclusive:
[I]t may well be the case that Riverside Bayview's reasoning-supporting jurisdic-
tion without any inquiry beyond adjacency-could apply equally to wetlands adja-
cent to certain major tributaries. Through regulations or adjudication, the Corps
may choose to identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow
(either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other re-
levant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are
likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic sys-
tem incorporating navigable waters.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780-81. Justice Kennedy noted further that "[w]here an adequate nexus
is established for a particular wetland, it may be permissible, as a matter of administrative
convenience or necessity, to presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the
region." Id. at 782.
120. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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"depressional wetlands,"'22 "flats wetlands,"'23 and "slope wetlands"' 24 are
more likely to be geographically separated from waters that would qualify as
"waters of the United States" under the plurality's test and for that reason
less likely to be considered "adjacent" for Justice Kennedy's "conclusive
standard for jurisdiction," those wetlands will more likely have to satisfy the
"significant nexus" test to be jurisdictional.
VII. OPERATION OF THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST IN PRACTICE
Although Justice Kennedy's significant nexus standard provides an os-
tensibly cogent approach for solving the "navigable waters" versus "waters
of the United States" conundrum'25 and even though, as recognized by Jus-
tice Stevens in his dissent, that "test will probably not do much to diminish
the number of wetlands covered by the Act in the long run,"'12 6 the "signifi-
cant nexus" test will seriously handicap the efficient and effective operation
of the § 404(a) wetlands protection program. As a practical matter, making
the significant nexus determination will have a decidedly negative impact on
the time and expense required for the § 404(a) permit process. The steps that
process contemplates generally require that the permit applicant first retain
the services of an expert wetlands delineation consultant to visit and investi-
gate the site and delineate the site's wetland boundaries in accordance with
the Corps' Delineation Manual. Corps personnel then review the consult-
ant's work product and issue a jurisdictional determination.'27
Prior to Rapanos, the § 404(a) jurisdictional determination was gener-
ally limited to finding the presence of sufficient hydrophytic vegetation,
hydric soil, and hydrology, that is, simply determining whether wetlands
were present.'28 Now, to meet the requirements of Justice Kennedy's con-
trolling "significant nexus" test, once a conclusion is reached that the appli-
cation does cover wetlands, additional determinations must be made wheth-
er the wetlands, either alone or in combination with other wetlands in the
same region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of traditional navigable waters. 129 Making that additional determina-
122. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part III.
126. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 808 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. CoNNoLLY ET AL., supra note 1, at 91.
128. Since the Corps of Engineers' regulations were intended to extend § 404(a) jurisdic-
tion to the limits of the Commerce Clause, jurisdictional determinations were seldom an
issue.
129. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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tion is a time-consuming and expensive enterprise for the applicant and the
reviewing Corps' personnel. As noted by Justice Stevens:
Justice KENNEDY's approach will have the effect of creating additional
work for all concerned parties. Developers wishing to fill wetlands adja-
cent to ephemeral or intermittent tributaries of traditionally navigable
waters will have no certain way of knowing whether they need to get §
404 permits or not. And the Corps will have to make case-by-case (or
category-by-category) jurisdictional determinations, which will inevita-
bly increase the time and resources spent processing permit applications.
These problems are precisely the ones that Riverside Bayview's deferen-
tial approach avoided.
130
The terminology employed by the Supreme Court in setting the stan-
dards of both SWANCC and Rapanos contributes substantially to the diffi-
culties of implementing the decisions. As noted by three members of the
Jurisdiction Team of the EPA's Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Water-
sheds, both SWANCC and Rapanos:
create new scientific and technical challenges by significantly reinter-
preting the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Both decisions identified characteristics that a water must have to be
considered a "water of the United States" protected by the CWA, using
terms different from those typically used by aquatic resource scien-
tists."'
In addition to the lack of congruence between the Supreme Court's termi-
nology and that used by the scientists who must attempt to apply the Court's
standards, to some extent those standards are not consistent with the ap-
proach scientists take to making the determinations required. For instance,
the Jurisdiction Team members also note that, "the physical, chemical, and
biological relationship between a water and a downstream traditional water
is best understood when studied over several years, yet a conclusion regard-
ing whether the relationship is sufficient to meet Kennedy's 'significant
nexus' standard will be needed much more quickly."'
132
The abandonment of the established methods of science for the con-
trived processes imposed by the Supreme Court decisions is also reflected in
the Rapanos plurality's criterion that focuses on the importance of the per-
manency of the water's flow. The Jurisdiction Team members observe that
"[d]etermining if a water is 'relatively permanent' ideally requires consid-
130. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 809.
131. Donna Downing, Tracie-Lynn Nadeau & Rose Kwok, Technical and Scientific
Challenges in Implementing Rapanos' "Water of the United States," 22 A.B.A. Sec. Env.,
Energy, and Resources, Nat. Resources & Env't 42.
132. Id. at 44.
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eration of more than one year's set of observations, yet neither field staff nor
the regulated community can wait that long to complete a jurisdictional de-
termination."'' 33 The result is to leave the applicant's expert consultants and
Corps personnel without direction grounded in the science traditionally ap-
plied for drawing the wetlands jurisdictional conclusion."
With the fractured decision in Rapanos and the difficulties inherent in
attempted application of Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test, clarifica-
tion from the EPA and the Corps in the form of revised regulations or other
direction was urgently needed. In limited response to that need, on June 5,
2007, nearly a year after the Rapanos decision, the agencies jointly issued
the Rapanos Guidance Memorandum (the "Guidance"). 3 5 The Guidance is
directed to EPA regional and Corps district personnel in an effort to ensure
that jurisdictional wetlands determinations under the Act are consistent with
the Rapanos decision. 36
The permitting process outlined in the Guidance has the ironic effect of
vividly illustrating the problems that may arise from the practical applica-
tion of the "significant nexus" test. Although neither law nor regulation, the
Guidance is the Corps' and the EPA's attempt to translate Rapanos into
working standards governing the permitting process activities of their em-
ployees. 37 The Guidance purports to adopt Justice Stevens's suggestion that
Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands is satisfied if either the approach of the
133. Id.
134. "The legal standards from Rapanos do not easily translate into workable criteria for
use by the scientists who must apply the standards." Telephone Interview with Joyce Perser,
M.S.E. Biological Sciences, J.D., Chief of Regulatory Division, United States Army Corps of
Engineers, Little Rock District, in Little Rock, Ark. (Feb. 29, 2008) (emphasis added).
135. ENvmoNmENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNrrED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES, (2007),
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/RapanosGuidance6507.pdf [hereinafter Guidance].
136. Id. at 3.
137. As explained in the Guidance:
The CWA provisions and regulations described in this document contain legally
binding requirements. This guidance does not substitute for those provisions or
regulations, nor is it a regulation itself. It does not impose legally binding re-
quirements on EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community, and may not apply
to a particular situation depending on the circumstances. Any decisions regarding
a particular water will be based on the applicable statutes, regulations, and case
law. Therefore, interested persons are free to raise questions about the appropri-
ateness of the application of this guidance to a particular situation, and EPA
and/or the Corps will consider whether or not the recommendations or interpreta-
tions of this guidance are appropriate in that situation based on the statutes, regu-
lations, and case law.
Id. at 4 n.16.
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plurality or Justice Kennedy is satisfied. 138 The Guidance applies the signifi-
cant nexus test to the following described waters: (1) non-navigable tributar-
ies that are not relatively permanent; (2) wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
tributaries that are not relatively permanent (including "similarly situated"
wetlands); and (3) wetlands adjacent to, but not directly abutting, a rela-
tively permanent tributary (for example, wetlands separated from a perma-
nent tributary by uplands, a berm, dike or similar feature).,
39
The problems wrought by the significant nexus test are most clearly re-
flected in the complex process the Guidance prescribes for application of the
test:
. A significant nexus analysis will assess the flow characteristics and
functions of the tributary itself and the functions performed by any wet-
lands adjacent to the tributary to determine if they significantly affect the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of downstream traditional na-
vigable waters.
* Significant nexus includes consideration of hydrologic factors includ-
ing the following:
- volume, duration, and frequency of flow, including consideration of
certain physical characteristics of the tributary
- proximity to the traditional navigable water
- size of the watershed
- average annual rainfall
- average annual winter snow pack
* Significant nexus also includes consideration of ecologic factors in-
cluding the following:
- potential of tributaries to carry pollutants and flood waters to tradi-
tional navigable waters
- provision of aquatic habitat that supports a traditional navigable wa-
ter
- potential of wetlands to trap and filter pollutants or store flood wa-
ters
138. "When there is no majority opinion in a Supreme Court case, controlling legal prin-
ciples may be derived from those principles espoused by five or more justices. Thus, regula-
tory jurisdiction under the CWA exists over a water body if either the plurality's or Justice
Kennedy's standard is satisfied." Id.
139. Id. at 7. "Similarly situated" wetlands include all wetlands adjacent to the same
tributary. Id. The inclusion in the Guidance of "similarly situated" wetlands within the possi-
ble jurisdictional bounds of the significant nexus determination stems from Justice Kennedy's
statement in his Rapanos concurrence that "wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus
come within the statutory phrase 'navigable waters,' if the wetlands, either alone or in com-
bination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable."'
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (emphasis added).
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- maintenance of water quality in traditional navigable waters
40
The Guidance further complicates matters by "generally" excluding
"[s]wales or erosional features (for example, gullies, small washes charac-
terized by low volume, infrequent, or short duration flow)" and "[d]itches
(including roadside ditches) excavated wholly in and draining only uplands
and that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water."''
The factors to be considered in making the significant nexus determina-
tion are fraught with difficulties of implementation--determinations requir-
ing significant and expensive examinations, testing and synthesis, all to be
undertaken by the landowner's expert consultants and agency personnel
possessing the technical education and experience appropriate to the tasks.
The validity of Justice Stevens's assessment that the significant nexus test
would create additional work for all concerned and require increased time
and resources as part of the permit process is evident from the steps the
Guidance outlines for making the significant nexus determination. The diffi-
culty of Justice Kennedy's approach is not that significant nexus fails to
accommodate the divergent "navigable waters" and "waters of the United
States" definitional aspects of the Act's jurisdiction, but that the effort of the
EPA and the Corps to give flesh to the determination of whether wetlands
"significantly affect the chemical, physical and biological integrity" of
downstream traditional navigable waters inevitably results in a complex
process so taxing of the human resources, time, and finances of all involved
as to raise the question of whether the "game is worth the candle" and
whether the process mandated by the guidance is workable in practice. The
costs in terms of time and expense of satisfying the significant nexus test
may well overwhelm the benefit of making the significant nexus determina-
tion.'42
Anecdotal evidence abounds that the significant nexus test has mark-
edly strained the wetlands jurisdictional determination process. 4 However,
140. Guidance, supra note 135, at 7 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. The Rapanos decision and Guidance have significantly increased the processing
time for § 404(a) permits in the Little Rock District of the Corps of Engineers. Interview with
Joyce Perser, supra note 134.
143. Simultaneous with the issuance of the Rapanos Guidance on June 5, 2007, the EPA
and the Corps announced a six-month public comment period to solicit input on early experi-
ence with implementing the guidance. The comment period began on June 8, 2007, and was
extended an additional forty-five days to January 21, 2008. As of February 27, 2008, 1,820
comments had been posted to the website on which the comments are collected (some of the
comments were posted after the deadline). Most of the comments were critical of the Ra-
panos Guidance, both in regard to the substance of the Guidance and especially in regard to
the jurisdictional determination process established by the Guidance. The following comment
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the best and perhaps most certain evidence of that strain comes directly from
the EPA and the Corps in the form of statements about the impact of the
Guidance. The EPA's and Corps' comments about that impact follows:
Implementation of the Rapanos decision and guidance requires the agen-
cies to be more thorough in documenting their jurisdictional determina-
tions (JD)....
Workload throughout the 38 Corps districts will increase dramatically
and there will be shifts in workloads depending upon geographic factors.
Additional costs could range from $15 to $20 million to:
" Develop and conduct staff training;
" Process a 5,500+ backlog of jurisdictional determinations and a con-
comitant backlog of project proposals;
- Perform additional field and desk review work;
by a coal company environmental affairs manager reflects the general tenor of the comments
critical of the Guidance's effect on the permitting process:
Predictability of regulation is especially important to the mining industry given
the extraordinary amount of time, money, and planning inherent to the develop-
ment and management of most mining operations. Mine operators must conduct
a site delineation and assess CWA jurisdiction well in advance of any projects
that could potentially require a permit. The ability to determine CWA jurisdic-
tion, up front, in a clear and predictable way, is critical to the mining industry's
ability to compete in today's worldwide mineral and energy markets. Conse-
quently, the mining industry is interested in the establishment of a clear and pre-
dictable scope for federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction.
We are extremely concerned that the Rapanos Guidance sets forth cumbersome,
inefficient and time consuming procedures that will invariably cause further con-
fusion and costly delays in the CWA permitting program. Furthermore, with
Corps limited resources and field staff stretched so thin, the Corps's regulatory
program has reached a tipping point. Instead of the clarity it promised, the Guid-
ance is causing confusion and added delays in an already burdened and strained
permit decision making process, further exacerbating the existing permit back-
logs and delays that permittees are already experiencing.
The economic impact of permitting delays should not be underestimated .... The
current permitting backlog is critical.... Typically if these permits are not issued
within a certain period of time, corporate investments will be diverted away from
Appalachian coal production. Mine closures have a ripple effect in the communi-
ties in which they are located. While the economic impact of hundreds of people
losing high paying jobs on a small mining community may be obvious, failure to
obtain a Corps issued permit may trigger a series of shutdowns. For example, af-
ter the shutdown of just one mine recently in Appalachia, a large, local equip-
ment dealer began layoffs at its facility due to cancellation of equipment orders.
This type of the spillover effect can devastate communities.
Comment attachment submitted by Raymond R. Ashcraft, Jr., Manager, Environmental Af-
fairs & Permitting, Alliance Coal, LLC at PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS, REGULATIONS.GOV, DRAFT
EPA/ARMY GUIDANCE REGARDING CWA JURISDICTION AFTER RAPANOS 14 (comment submit-





" Conduct significant nexus determinations; and,
" Implement coordination/elevation requirements.
The additional time required to investigate, process, and complete JDs
will be substantially greater than in the pre-Rapanos regulatory climate.
Although the greatest workload impact falls on the Corps field person-
nel, EPA also will experience increased staffing demands associated with
jurisdictional determinations. In conducting its environmental oversight
of the regulatory program, EPA Regional staff will have increased field
and desk review activities, especially in resolving any controversial ju-
risdictional determination cases.'44
Another factor adding to the complexity of the wetlands jurisdictional
decision is that under the Guidance the agencies are to be more thorough in
documenting the decision. The documentation requirement involves com-
pletion of a revised Jurisdictional Decision form'45 as prescribed by a sixty
page (including appendices) "Jurisdictional Determination Form Instruc-
tional Guidebook.', 146 In addition, the "Guidance Coordination Memoran-
dum" requires that wetland jurisdictional decisions involving non-navigable,
intra-state, isolated waters, and "significant nexus" determinations be ele-
vated to Corps Headquarters for review prior to the district office final deci-
sion on jurisdiction, regardless of whether jurisdiction is asserted or de-
clined.4 7 Of course, the documentation and elevated review requirements
add to the time and expense of the wetlands jurisdictional decision.
Divorced from considerations of practical efficacy, Justice Kennedy's
formulation of the significant nexus test and the components of the test work
a plausible resolution of the "navigable waters" versus "waters of the United
States" conundrum. In giving substance to the significant nexus test, how-
ever, Justice Kennedy, in Justice Scalia's assessment, "all on his own,"'4 s
divines a regulatory standard from the "navigable waters" and "waters of the
144. United States ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE HIGHLIGHTS FOR RAPANOS AND CARABELL DECISION 2-3
(2007), http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/cwa-guide/guidhigh_06-05-07.pdf.
145. Approved JD Form, Appendix B, JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM
INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK (2007),
http://www.usace.army.nillcw/cecwo/reg/cwa-,guide/jdguidebook_051207finai.pdf.
146. JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK (2007).
147. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND UNITED STATES ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CIVIL WORKS AND US EPA REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATORS (Coordination Memorandum) 1-4 (2007),
http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/cwa-guide/rapanos-moa_06-05-07.pdf, as modi-
fied by UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, MAJOR
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND DISTRICTS (2008),
http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/cwa-guide/jdcoord-proc-28janO8.pdf.
148. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757 (2006). This is Justice Scalia's descrip-




United States" language of the statute that: the Corps of Engineers may as-
sert regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands as "navigable waters" under §
404(a) "if the wetlands, [either] alone or in combination with similarly situ-
ated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity" of traditional navigable waters, unless the wetlands' ef-
fects "on water quality are speculative or insubstantial."149 This interpreta-
tion of the statutory language is tantamount to a rule or regulation written to
give more specific effect to the statute. Comparison of the "significant nex-
us" standard as articulated by Justice Kennedy with the components of the
Administrative Procedure Act's definition of a rule illustrates the regulatory
nature of the standard: "'[R]ule' means the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organiza-
"1150tion, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency ....
The difficulty that arises from Justice Kennedy's attempt to "imple-
ment, interpret or prescribe more specific meaning" to "navigable waters"-
"waters of the United States"-is that the impact of his test was not subject
to the processes that would be required of a similar regulatory standard is-
sued by a federal administrative agency. The failure of the significant nexus
test as a workable standard vividly demonstrates the value of those proc-
esses.
That the significant nexus test would fail in practice could have been
foreseen had it been subjected to processes similar to those applicable to
issuance of regulatory standards by federal administrative agencies. For
instance, had the notice, public comment, and evaluation requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act 15 and the Regulatory Planning and Re-
view process, outlined for adoption of federal regulations in Executive Order
No. 23,866,152 been applied to the significant nexus standard, the practical
deficiencies of the test would have become apparent. Although application
of that process to the significant nexus test from Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence is somewhat fanciful, undertaking a hypothetical application of the
process serves to demonstrate why, if the test had been subjected to the
process, its efficacy in practice would have been suspect from its inception.
The sections of the Regulatory Planning and Review process most pertinent
to consideration of the efficacy of the significant nexus test include require-
ments that:
1. The agency make a qualitative and quantitative assessment of costs
and benefits of the regulation.
149. Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
151. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
152. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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2. The agency consider the costs and benefits of alternative regulatory
approaches.
3. The agency's decision be based on the best reasonably obtainable
scientific, technical, economic, and other information concerning the need
for, and consequences of, the intended regulation.
4. The agency seek views of appropriate state, local, and tribal officials
before imposing regulatory requirements that might significantly or unique-
ly affect those governmental entities.
5. The agency assess the effects of the regulation on state, local, and
tribal governments, including specifically the availability of resources to
carry out the regulation, and seek to minimize those burdens that uniquely or
significantly affect such governmental entities, consistent with achieving
regulatory objectives.
6. The agency tailor the regulation to impose the least burden on soci-
ety, including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities
(including small communities and governmental entities), consistent with
obtaining the regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things
and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations.
15
1
Consideration of those factors would have revealed that the costs asso-
ciated with making the significant nexus determination outweigh the bene-
fits of the test when compared with a clearer cut alternative test such as ad-
vocated by Justices Stevens or Breyer.' 54 Notice to the public and to con-
cerned state and local governmental entities would have produced comments
and suggestions that could have been factored into the decision making
process that may well have produced a regulation that would have been
Constitutional, consistent with the statutory language, and workable in prac-
tice. A regulation that, to paraphrase Justice Stevens's comment, would have
assisted developers wishing to fill wetlands to know whether they need to
153. Id.
154. Justice Stevens would find wetland adjacency to navigable water tributaries alone
sufficient for Corps jurisdiction without specific evidence of "connectivity" or "significant
nexus":
I think it clear that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters generally
have a 'significant nexus' with the traditionally navigable waters downstream...
. [T]hese wetlands can obviously have a cumulative effect on downstream water
flow by releasing waters at times of low flow or by keeping waters back at times
of high flow. This logical connection alone gives the wetlands the 'limited' con-
nection to traditionally navigable waters that is all the statute requires.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 808 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens stated further: "Unlike Justice
KENNEDY, I see no reason to change Riverside Bayview's approach-and every reason to
continue to defer to the Executive's sensible, bright-line rule." Id. at 809. And, Justice Breyer
would hold that the Corps' wetland jurisdictional authority "extends to the limits of congres-
sional power to regulate interstate commerce," that the Corps' regulations are within those
limits, and that the regulations are entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 809. See supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text for discussion of Chevron deference.
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get § 404 permits and would not have required that landowners' consultants
and Corps personnel undertake complex time and resource consuming case-
by-case jurisdictional determinations.' 5 '
Was the significant nexus test constitutionally required or mandated by
the language of the definitional provisions of the Clean Water Act? Justice
Scalia for the plurality complained that Justice Kennedy "simply rewrites
the statute, using for that purpose the gimmick of 'significant nexus, '", 56 and
that Justice Kennedy "has devised his new statute all on his own. It purports
to be, not a grudging acceptance of an agency's close-to-the-edge expansion
of its own powers, but rather the most reasonable interpretation of the law. It
is far from that .... ."57
VII. RESOLUTION OF THE WETLAND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES CREATED BY
THE CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTIONAL DEFINITIONS, THE RAPANOS
DECISION, AND THE RAPANoS GUIDANCE
If not broken, the Corps' wetland jurisdictional determination process
is certainly in need of repair. Relief could come from a clarifying decision
of the United States Supreme Court, revised regulations of the EPA and
Corps, or legislative restatement of the jurisdictional reach of regulatory
authority under § 404(a). Another decision of the Supreme Court is not cur-
rently on the horizon, and considering the division among the justices of the
Court in Rapanos, clarification from the Court would appear to be unlikely,
at least until there is a change in the Court's composition.
In statements associated with the issuance of the Guidance, the EPA
and the Corps have indicated a vaguely expressed intent to adopt revised
regulations:
Rulemaking is among several actions the Administration is considering
in response to the Rapanos decision. Rulemaking takes time--certainly
well over a year to develop a final rule, in part, because of the important
public notice and comment provisions called for under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Agency guidance can more quickly assist regulators,
the regulated community, and the public to understand and consistently
apply the CWA.... Any decision to pursue new rulemaking will be col-
155. Justice Stevens's comment was:
Developers wishing to fill wetlands adjacent to ephemeral or intermittent tribu-
taries of traditionally navigable waters will have no certain way of knowing
whether they need to get § 404 permits or not. And the Corps will have to make
case-by-case (or category-by-category) jurisdictional determinations, which will
inevitably increase the time and resources spent processing permit applications.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 809.
156. Id. at 756.
157. Id. at 756-57.
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laborative, as will the substantive work of developing any new rules to
establish a revised regulatory definition of "waters of the [United
States]."'5 8
"The agencies intend to more broadly consider jurisdictional issues, in-
cluding clarification and definition of key terminology, through rulemaking
or other appropriate policy practice."' 5 9
A fair conclusion to be drawn from the indefinite statements that the
agencies may at some point engage in clarifying rulemaking when coupled
with the reality that a change of Presidential administrations is on the near
horizon is that the issuance of revised regulations will not occur for several
years, if at all. In addition, since the decisions in Rapanos purport to be dri-
ven by interpretation of the "waters of the United States" language of §
404(a) rather than the strictures of the Constitution, any rulemaking would
be constrained by the statutory standard and the interpretation of that stan-
dard in Rapanos. In short, revised regulations could well provide little more
direction than the Rapanos Guidance itself.
The prospect of clarification through a legislative solution appears
somewhat more promising. Bills styled "The Clean Water Restoration Act
of 2007" are pending in both houses of Congress."6 Section 4, the heart of
the proposed act, adopts verbatim the operative language of the central defi-
nition of "waters of the United States" from the existing Corps of Engineers
Regulations:'
61
The term "waters of the United States" means all waters subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all interstate and intra-
state waters and their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (includ-
ing intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, natural ponds, and all impound-
ments of the foregoing, to the fullest extent that these waters, or activi-
ties affecting these waters, are subject to the legislative power of Con-
gress under the Constitution.62
158. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, CORPS AND EPA RESPONSES TO THE RAPANOS DECISION: KEY QUESTIONS FOR
GUIDANCE RELEASE 6 (2007), http:l/www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/l 3RapanosQ&As.pdf.
159. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE HIGHLIGHTS FOR RAPANOS AND CARABELL
DECISION 3 (2007), http://www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/cwa-guide/guidhigh_06-05-
07.pdf.
160. Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, S. 1870, 110th Cong. (2007).
161. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
162. Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, 110th Cong. § 4, (2007); Clean
Water Restoration Act of 2007, S. 1870, 110th Cong. § 4, (2007).
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Enactment of the proposed legislation would return wetland jurisdictional
determinations to at least pre-Rapanos circumstances and bring needed clar-
ity to the process. However, to date the only action in either house has been
to refer the bills to committees.'63
The combined impact of the fractured Rapanos decision and the Guid-
ance have left the wetlands jurisdictional determination process in disarray.
Perhaps action will be taken at some level to bring clarity to the wetland
jurisdictional determination process. Regardless, the aftermath of Rapanos
and the Guidance certainly provides cause to consider the accuracy of an
insightful observation reflected in an anonymous post to a Rapanos Guid-
ance website discussion forum:
It would appear that each and every time a plaintiff brings a case against
the authority of Section 404 administration, the courts conjure a well-
intentioned, but scientifically uninformed opinion. Then, it winds-up that
the greater regulated public is who's made to pay the price of the courts'
ambiguity and ignorance .... 164
163. On May 23, 2007 H.R. 2421 was referred to the House Subcommittee on Water
Resources and Environment, and on July 25, 2007, S. 1870 was referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Environment and Public Works.
164. Anonymous response posted to Federal Highway Administration website discussion
forum, RE: NEPA FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 11-12
(posted Feb. 5, 2008,
http://nepa.fhwa.dot.gov/ReNEPA/ReNepa.nsf/discussionDisplay?Open&id=D6299D396AO
0BOAF852573E5006D397C&Group=Natural%20Environment&tab=DISCUSSION.
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